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11 Introduction
More and more voluntary organizations wish to raise money for charity purposes through a
partnership with ﬁrms. While Charity auctions have been held in the United States for many
years now, in China this phenomenon has emerged recently and is in strong progress.1 In this
kinds of auction, an object is sold (for example a key case with zero value or an item given
by a luxury brand). The proceeds then go to charity. Most of these auctions are planned
and organized in charity dinners where only wealthy or famous people can participate. Beyond
the item value, the valuations of potential bidders depend on their interest in this voluntary
organization (their altruism or philanthropy) and on the degree to which they show some kind
of conformism “to be seen as the most wealthy and generous”. For instance, in China’s traditional
society, charity auctions were not organized. The participants preferred to keep a low proﬁle
about their bids. However, time has changed: the rich and famous now display their wealth
through their involvement in charity auctions. According to the Beijing Review:
With the development of society, more rich people are emerging. They have
their own lifestyle [...] Some day, behind the rich lifestyle, people will ﬁnd that
it is only by oﬀering their love and generosity that they can realize their true
class.
Thus, through charity auctions, potential bidders can build their position in their social class.
Everybody wishes, independently of the winner’s identity, to raise the highest revenue. Potential
bidders make a trade-oﬀ between giving money for the fundraising and keeping it for another
personal use. Contrary to non-charity auctions though, here the amount paid is “never lost”.
A wealthy investor, who bought a Dior perfume for 60 000 yuans (about 6 000 euros or 7 700
dollars) – with a reserve price of 20 000 yuans – recently said in the Beijing Review:
I would never buy perfume for this amount normally, but this time it is for
charity. I feel very happy.
Since, in fact, the money raised is used to ﬁnance a charitable purpose, every participant of
the charity auction can beneﬁt from it, independently of the winner’s identity. More precisely,
the money raised by each potential bidder impacts the utility of all participants as they take
advantage of an externality of the amount of the money raised for the charity purpose.
Under complete information, these kinds of auctions can be compared to the work of Ettinger
(2002) who analyzes a general winner-pay auction framework with ﬁnancial externalities.2 These
externalities do not depend on the winner’s identity and can be applied to charity auctions where
only the winner pays.3 Moreover, he shows that there is no “revenue equivalence” with these
externalities. Maasland and Onderstal (2007) investigate winner-pay auctions with this kind of
linear externalities in an independent private signals model. Their paper can also be applied to
charity. They ﬁnd similar qualitative predictions as Ettinger (2002): the second-price winner-
pay auction outperforms4 the ﬁrst-price winner-pay auction. In their recent paper, Goeree et al.
1For example, in 2004, at the Formula One Grand Prix opening dinner party in Shanghai (China), an auction
was held of racing suits and crash helmets used by famous racing drivers (Beijing Review, 2005).
2To the best of our knowledge, Ettinger (2002) is the only one to consider general externalities which could
be non-linear.
3Actually, Ettinger (2002) investigates a framework with two kind of externalities. One is independent of the
winner’s identity and the other depends on the winner’s identity.
4In the following, outperform means generate higher revenue.
2(2005) analyze charity auctions in the symmetric independent private values model. They show
that, given the externality, all-pay auctions raise more money for charity than winner-pay auc-
tions (second-price outperforms ﬁrst-price) and lotteries. In particular, they determine that the
optimal fundraising mechanism is the lowest-price all-pay auction with an entry fee and a reserve
price. Engers and McManus (2007) ﬁnd closed results to Goeree et al. (2005).5 Contrary to
Goeree et al. (2005), a psychological eﬀect comes into play: the winner beneﬁts from a higher
externality with her own bid, the others’ bids having a lower eﬀect on him. In their setting,
as in Goeree et al. (2005), ﬁrst-price all-pay auctions and second-price winner-pay auctions are
better to raise money than ﬁrst-price winner-pay auctions. Moreover, ﬁrst-price all-pay auctions
outperform each winner-pay auction only for a suﬃciently high number of bidders. Additionally,
Engers and McManus (2007) show that there are many optimal charity auctions, among them
a ﬁrst-price winner-pay auction with suitable fees and cancelling threat, for example.
The predictions of Goeree et al. (2005) and Engers and McManus (2007) have been tested ex-
perimentally with contradictory results. Onderstal and Schram (2009) have tested Goeree et al.’s
(2005) results experimentally in the laboratory. They are the ﬁrst to conduct a lab experiment
for charity auctions in an independent private value setting. Their results are closed to the
theoretical predictions: in charity auctions, the ﬁrst-price all-pay auction raises higher revenues
than other mechanisms (ﬁrst-price winner-pay auction and lotteries). Carpenter et al. (2008)
have tested the predictions of Engers and McManus (2007) and Goeree et al. (2005) in a ﬁeld
experiment. Similar objects are sold in four American pre-schools through three diﬀerent mech-
anisms which are the ﬁrst-price all-pay auction, and the ﬁrst-price and second-price winner-pay
auctions. They study the determinants of the bidders’ behavior and the revenue raised. Con-
trary to the theoretical predictions, ﬁrst-price all-pay auctions do not produce higher revenues
than the winner-pay auctions. Therefore, if auction theory applied to charity is conﬁrmed in the
laboratory, this is not the case in the ﬁeld. The main explanation for the gap between theory
and ﬁeld experiment could be a non-participation eﬀect, due to the unfamiliarity with these
mechanisms and their complexity: the participants did not know the all-pay design and few
took part in second-price auctions on the Internet.
The purpose of this paper is to determine whether or not all-pay auctions can raise higher
revenue for charity than winner-pay auctions when bidders are asymmetric. We consider a
complete information framework. As already mentioned, many charity auctions are conducted
among rich people during charity dinners. These events could occur in a local service club (like
the Rotary Club6 or another type of voluntary organization) or during a show business dinner.
Potential bidders are acquaintances or know one another well. Consequently, a complete infor-
mation environment is well suited for these kinds of situation.
We analyze all-pay auctions for charity as a mechanism. This approach relies on a general
model which can be applied to both ﬁrst and second-price all-pay auctions. In our framework,
the externalities are such that every bidder takes as much advantage (obtains as much utility)
5Besides, Engers and McManus (2007) diﬀerentiate situations in which the auctioneer can or cannot threaten
to cancel the auction, which change their results.
6The Rotary Club is a worldwide organization of business and professional leaders that provides humanitarian
services, encourages high ethical standards in all vocations, and helps build goodwill and peace in the world. There
are about 32 000 clubs in 200 countries and geographical areas and 1,000 clubs in France like Paris, but also in
small town like Niort. http://www.rotary.org/
3of her own bid as of her rival’s bid. Additionally, we deﬁne bidder i’s adjusted-value as the
ratio of her value for the item sold to the fraction of her payment which she perceives as a cost
given her altruism for the charity purpose. Then, we arrange bidders in such a way that the
adjusted-values and the valuations are ranked in the same order. We discuss this ranking and
its consequences.
We characterize the ﬁrst-price all-pay auction equilibrium and compute the expected revenue;
but there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. As in a case without externalities, only the two
bidders with the highest adjusted-values are active. Moreover, we establish the existence of a
Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies with non-linear externalities.
The equilibrium in the second-price all-pay auction is also characterized and the expected
revenue computed. Then, we compare our results to Ettinger (2002) who analyzes winner-pay
auctions with externalities that do not depend on the identity of the winner and which could be
applied to charity auctions.
The revenue of the all-pay auctions can be dominated by the revenue of the winner-pay
auctions contrary to the results of Goeree et al. (2005). Actually, above a certain threshold of
asymmetry in the bidders’ valuations, winner-pay auctions raise more money for charity than the
all-pay auctions. Our result can also be related to the work of Carpenter et al. (2008). Indeed,
their results could be due to a strong asymmetry between bidders. Moreover, we reexamine our
result by an analysis of the bidders’ altruism.
2 The model
We describe all-pay auctions for charity as mechanisms. This approach relies on a general model
which can be applied to both ﬁrst and second-price all-pay auctions.7
In a charity dinner, an indivisible object (or prize) is sold through an all-pay auction. This
prize is allocated to one of the potential bidders N = {1,...,n} contingent upon their bids
x = (x1,...,xn) ∈ Rn
+. As the bidders usually meet each other in these kinds of events, the
willingness to pay and the valuation ranking of each bidder, v1 > v2 > ... > vn, are common
knowledge. An all-pay auction is a pair (a,t), a being the allocation rule and t the payment
rule.
Allocation Rule. The allocation rule a = (a1,...,an) : Rn
+ −→ [0,1]n is such that the winner
i gets the object if and only if ai(x) = 1 given the bids and
 n
i=1 ai(x) = 1 for all x. The object
is allocated to the highest bidder such that
 
ai(x) = 1
#Q(x) if i ∈ Q(x)
ai(x) = 0 otherwise
where Q(x) := {j|j = argmax{xk,k ∈ N}} is the collection of the highest bids.
Payment Rule. The payment rule t = (t1,...,tn) : Rn
+ −→ Rn
+ represents for each bidder
i her transfer ti(x) to the charity organization for the vector of bids x. This payment rule is
7Vartiainen (2007) uses this kind of general layout for a non-charity framework. Our approach is diﬀerent.
Indeed, in our case, every bidder takes as much advantage of her own bid as of her rival’s bid thanks to introduction
of the externalities.
4contingent upon the all-pay design. In a ﬁrst-price all-pay auction, each bidder pays her own
bid
ti(x) = xi ∀i ∈ N
while in the second-price all-pay auction the winner pays the second highest bid and the losers
their own bid
ti(x) = x(2) if i ∈ Q(x)
ti(x) = xi otherwise
with x(2) the second order statistic of the sample (x1,...,xn).
Bidders wish to raise the maximum of money for charity. Each bidder takes advantage of her
own participation in the charity auction and of the others’ participations as well. In other words,
the money raised by each potential bidder impacts the utility of all the participants including
herself. Thus, the bidder’s utility function includes an externality which depends on the amount
of money raised for the charity purpose. Denote hi(t(x)) the externality from which bidder i




Indeed, the externality is independent of the winner’s identity and only takes into account the
amount raised. Except in Section 3.2, we make a linearity assumption regarding the form of the












where αi ≥ 0 is the coeﬃcient of bidder i’s altruism for the charity purpose. Thus, bidder i’s
utility is given by




The next assumption is useful only for non-linear externalities.
Assumption 1 (A1). ˜ Ui(ai,t) is a continuous and diﬀerentiable function in the transfer func-
tions tj for all j.
Thus, in the case of non-linear externalities, hi(t(x)) is continuous and diﬀerentiable in all
of its arguments.
Assumption 2 (A2). ∀xi ≥ 0
∂ ˜ Ui
∂ti(x)






This assumption means that the bidder has a strict preference to keep one euro for her own
use rather than to give it to the charity auction. This is the limit to the bidders’ altruism to give
money for charity.9 The limit of the bidders’ altruism is aﬀected by the payment rule. Indeed,
bidder i’s transfer can be a function of her opponents’ bids and then do the same transfers.
Thus, a change in the payment rule leads to a new limit of the bidders’ altruism: in ﬁrst-price






= 1 then the bidder is indiﬀerent between giving one euro for charity or investing it in an
another activity.
5it is αi < 1 while in second-price αi < 1/2.
Denote Fi(x) ≡ P(Xi ≤ x) the cumulative distribution functions such that bidder i decides to
submit a bid inferior to x. We denote Fi(0) the probability that bidder i bids 0. When Fi(0)  = 0,
bidder i bids zero with a strictly positive probability. When Fi(0) = 1, bidder i always bids zero
which means that she does not participate in the auction. F1,...,Fn can be interpreted as the





































with X−i = (X1,...,Xi−1,Xi+1,...,Xn). From (1) and (2) we can notice that the events
{#Q(x) = 1} and {#Q(x) > 1} are disjoint. Thus, when #Q(x) > 1 the value of the in-
tegral is zero. Indeed, a tie is a zero measure event.
Let us denote by vi
1−αi bidder i’s adjusted-value. Bidders i’s adjusted-value is deﬁned as the
ratio of her value for the item sold and the fraction of her payment which she perceives as a cost
given her altruism for the charity purpose. We can observe this adjusted-value in the expected
utility with a normalisation by dividing it by 1 − αi. As bidders are ex ante asymmetric, we
arrange them such that vi










3 First-Price All-Pay Auction
In this section, we study the most popular all-pay auction design, i.e. the ﬁrst-price all-pay
auction. Every bidder pays her own bid, but only the one with the highest bid wins the object.
Given assumption A2, there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. This is a well known
result when there is no externality. We only provide a sketch of the proof of this result with two
bidders for the ﬁrst-price all-pay auction with externalities.
Let us assume that xi ≥ xj and consider some general externalities (not necessarily linear) given
by hi(xi,xj). In such a framework, two cases can occur. First, if bidder j can overbid, then
her best reply is xi + ε, for ε > 0 such that vj − (xi + ε) + hj(xi,xi + ε) ≥ −xj + hj(xi,xj).
Hence, it is impossible that xi ≥ xj. Second, if j cannot overbid, then his best reply consists
in oﬀering zero since, given assumption A2, hj(xi,0) > −xj + hj(xi,xj). Consequently, i’s best
reply is to oﬀer ε > 0. As a result, the equilibrium is unstable and there is no pure strategy
Nash equilibrium.
63.1 Linear Externalities
As we noticed in the last section, assumption A2 implies that αi < 1. If bidder i oﬀers xi, then j
will oﬀer less with probability Fj(xi) and will oﬀer more with probability 1− Fj(xi). Whatever
the outcome, bidder i beneﬁts from the sum of all bids, including her own. When computing her
expected utility, she takes the amount paid by each opponent into account. Bidder i’s expected








A potential bidder takes part in the auction if for some bids her expected utility is equal to or
higher than the externalities she beneﬁts when her bid is zero. Formally, a bidder takes part in
the auction if






j =i EXj bidder i’s expected reservation utility when she takes part in the auction.
We call the highest price at which a given bidder is ready to take part in the auction her
indiﬀerence price. i’s indiﬀerence price is denoted by ˜ xi and satisﬁes EUi(˜ xi) = αi
 
j =i EXj.
























All other bidders use the pure strategy of bidding zero and do not take part in the auction:













Thanks to Hillman and Riley (1989) and Baye et al. (1996), this result is easy to obtain.
Dividing bidders’ i expected utility by 1−αi we obtain an aﬃne transformation of the expected
utility without externality given by Hillman and Riley (1989) and Baye et al. (1996). Indeed,
in our case the adjusted-values
vi
1 − αi






EXj which is constant at the equilibrium. As the result of Baye
et al. (1996) is invariant with respect of positive aﬃne transformations of expected utility, the
mixed strategies are invariant with respect to dividing by 1 − αi and adding a constant to the
expected utility. Then our result follows.
Corollary 1. All bidders obtain a positive payoﬀ. Indeed, the bidders with the two highest
adjusted-values obtain a positive payoﬀ U⋆

























for i ∈ {3,...,n}.
Proof. Computations. ￿
Contrary to the case with no externality (see Hillman and Riley (1989) and Baye et al.
(1996)), the highest bidder’s opponents get a positive payoﬀ. This is a consequence of the
externalities: bidders beneﬁt from their competitors’ behavior.
7Remark 1. Let us assume that the diﬀerence between α1 and α2 is large enough for bidder 1’s
adjusted-value to be ranked second such that the two highest adjusted-values are permuted. Then
bidder 1 can get a lower payoﬀ than in the case with no externality if and only if her altruism
level is lower than ˜ α ≡ 2 v1−v2
3v1−2v2. We notice that this threshold does not depend on her rival’s
altruism level, while the changes in the ranking of the adjusted-values is only due to the diﬀerence
between the players’ altruism levels.
We can notice here that there are two opposite eﬀects. Because of the externalities, the
value of one euro that is invested in the auction is less than one euro. Thus, it is possible that
the bidders choose more aggressive oﬀers. However, each bidder knows that her competitor is
more aggressive and that this will aﬀect one’s probability of winning. Given an increase of her
competitor’s aggressiveness, the bidder’s best reply could be to raise or lower her bid.
3.2 Non-Linear Externalities
We extend our result to non-linear externalities. We consider two bidders only, such that the
expected utility is given by,
EU1(x1,X2) = F2(x1)(v1 + EX2(h1(x1,X2)\X2 ≤ x1) − x1) + (1 − F2(x1))(EX2(h1(x1,X2)\X2 ≥ x1) − x1)
EU2(x2,X1) = F1(x2)(v2 + EX1(h2(X1,x2)\X1 ≤ x2) − x2) + (1 − F1(x2))(EX1(h2(X1,x2)\X1 ≥ x2) − x2)








h1(x1,x2)dF2(x2) if x1 > 0
0 otherwise
It can also be written as
 
EU1(x1,X2) = F2(x1)v1 − x1 + EX2h1(x1,X2)
EU2(x2,X1) = F1(x2)v2 − x2 + EX1h2(X1,x2)
Bidder i takes part in the auction if her expected utility is higher than her reservation utility:
∃ xi such that EUi(xi,Xj) ≥ EXjhi(0,Xj)
Proposition 2. Given assumptions A1 − A2 the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium exists.
Proof. See in Appendix. ￿
The expected utility’s derivative is a Fredholm equation of the second type. The existence
of a solution depends on a condition made on the kernel (the kernel being the externality here).
Nonetheless, given that the solution is a distribution function deﬁned on a closed and convex
set of continuous distribution functions, we are able to show its existence by using Schauder’s
second theorem without this standard condition. The solution seems to be unique only in very
speciﬁc cases, as a known result in the literature on Fredholm equations shows.10
4 Second-Price All-Pay Auction
In a second-price all-pay auction, the payment rule is as follows: the winner pays the second
highest bid and the others pay their own bid. Our purpose is now to determine the bidders’
10Kanwal (1971) has written a very complete book on these questions while Ledder (1996) provides a simple
method and ﬁnds another condition to prove the solution’s uniqueness.
8strategies and the expected revenue. In the next section, we will compare the rents obtained in
ﬁrst-price and second-price auctions, as well as winner-pay and all-pay auctions. As a result, we
will know which of these designs is the best to raise money for charity.
It is not necessary to ﬁnd each agent’s probability distribution’s support in order to deter-
mine the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Actually, we only need to assume that each bidder i’s
oﬀer, xi belongs to a strategy space [0,+∞). For the same reasons as in the ﬁrst-price auction,
the bidders’ minimum valuations is zero. As noticed before, assumption A2 allows us to write
that αi < 1/2.
There are a continuum of pure strategy equilibria as in the situations without externalities.
Hendricks et al. (1988) show such equilibria are never subgame perfect in the dynamic version
of the auction which is strategically equivalent to the static version.11 Thus, we focus on the
completely mixed strategy equilibria. As the support of the strategies is R+, strategies are
completely mixed. Then, strategies are continuous, atomless and gapless (see Moulin (1986) for
more details). In the two bidders case the payment rule leads to t1(x) = t2(x). Thus, when a
bidder wins she pays her rival’s bid. In addition, each bidder beneﬁts from two externalities, one
associated with her own bid, and the other associated with her rival’s bid. Then the expected




(vi − (1 − 2αi)x)dFj(x) − (1 − 2αi)xi(1 − Fj(xi)).
Dividing by 1 − 2αi, this expected utility is qualitatively equivalent to the one without any
externalities (see Vartiainen (2007)). However, it is not the case anymore for n bidders. Indeed,
externalities have a diﬀerent eﬀect depending on whether bidder i is the winner, the second
highest bidder or a loser with a bid inferior to the second highest bid. Then the expected
utility and the equilibrium are non-intuive and diﬃcult to compute with n bidders. Let us note
Gi(x) =
 




































The transition from the equation (2) to the equation (3) is explained in the proof of Proposi-
tion 3 given in the appendix. The two terms in the ﬁrst line represent bidder i’s payoﬀ depending
on whether she wins or loses the auction, given the externality that arises from her own action.





vi + (2αi − 1)xj if xi > xj
vi
2
+ (2αi − 1)xi if xi = xj
(2αi − 1)xi if xi < xj
As before, we note ˜ xi bidder i’s indiﬀerence price, such that ˜ x1 > ˜ x2. Let xi be bidder i’s oﬀer. Thus, pure
strategy Nash equilibria are
(0,β1) with β1 ∈ (˜ x1,+∞)
(β2,0) with β2 ∈ (˜ x2,+∞)
and the revenue is zero.
9The other lines represent the externalities that come from her competitors’ actions (whether
they lose or win).
The ﬁrst of these two lines describes the situation where bidder l (l  = i) loses the auction.
In the last line bidder l wins the auction; we distinguish situations where bidder i’s bid is the
second highest oﬀer from situations where she is not. Each bidder’s oﬀer could be the second
highest bid and we take account of it (sum operator under the integral). The bidder who makes
an oﬀer between bidder i and bidder l’s oﬀers puts forward the second highest bid. The other




Fm(xi)(1−Fl(xi)) is the probability that every bidder except l makes
a lower bid than i. This probability is multiplied by the sum oﬀered by bidder i.
Note that this expression of the expected utility is valid for at least four bidders. In order
to study the three bidders case, it is necessary to (slightly) change the third line. To do this,
we have to stop at the second line of the computation of the term BI in the appendix. Thus,







xkdFk(xk)dFl(xl) + xiFk(xi)(1 − Fl(xi))
 
, where k is
neither i nor l.
Proposition 3. In the second-price all-pay auction only two bidders, named i and j, among n








∀x ∈ [0,+∞) and the expected revenue by ER =
2vivj
(1 − 2αi)vj + (1 − 2αj)vi
.
Proof. See in Appendix ￿
The weakness of this result is that we do not know which bidders are going to participate. Thus,
it might be that the two bidders with the highest values participate or the ones with the lowest
values. This has some consequences on the expected revenue.
5 Revenue Comparisons
In this section, we investigate the performance of the revenues and the expected revenues ob-
tained with the diﬀerent auction designs.
We consider here that bidders have the same altruism level i.e. α1 = α2 = α. Hence, the


















Indices APi and WPi correspond to ist-price all-pay and winner-pay auctions. If bidders are
thoroughly altruistic, i.e. αAP1 −→ 1 and αAP2 −→ 1/2, the expected revenues diverge as
Goeree et al. (2005) predicted. Thus, the altruism level is an essential element to determine the
expected revenue. When bidders’ altruism levels are the same, the rent of the auction is at least
equal to the rent one would obtain with non-altruistic bidders.
In the following, we compare our results on all-pay auctions with externalities to Ettinger’s
(2002) results on winner-pay auctions with externalities. These results are summed up in table
1:



















, i  = 1











, i  = 1
Table 1: Revenues and expected revenues
From the revenue equivalence principle, we know that all the auction designs with homoge-
neous values and without any externalities lead to the same revenue. Moreover, if we consider
homogeneous values with charity components (externalities), we ﬁnd the same qualitative re-
sults than Goeree et al. (2005). Then, externalities improve the revenue performance of the
all-pay auctions relatively to the winner-pay auctions. On the contrary, in a framework with
no externality and heterogeneous bidders, winner-pay auctions outperform the ﬁrst-price all-pay
auction and could outperform the second-price all-pay auction (this depends which bidders are
going to participate). Then, the asymmetry component improves the revenue performance of
the winner-pay auctions relative to the ﬁrst-price all-pay auctions and could improve it relative
to the second-price all-pay auction. Hence, asymmetry and charity have opposite eﬀects on the
revenue comparaison among all-pay and winner-pay auctions. Thus, the revenue comparison
result with charitable and asymmetric bidders is not obvious.
Moreover, if our framework is suited to charity dinners with complete information (for exam-
ple dinners held by a local Rotary Club), ﬁrst-price and second-price all-pay auctions contradict
Goeree et al.’s (2005) qualitative results. In order to analyze the impact of asymmetry on rents,
we use the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition. The level of asymmetry between bidders’ valuations will be considered very high if
v1 − v2 > 2α(v1 + v2), high if v1 − v2 > 2αv1, low if v1 − v2 < 2αv1 − v1 + v2
v2
v1 and medium if
2αv1 > v1 − v2 > 2αv1 − v1 + v2
v2
v1.
Proposition 4. We assume that αi = α ∀i and that the bidder with the highest value takes
part in the second-price all-pay auction. Then, this design raises the highest revenue such that
ERAP2 > RWP2 if and only if the level of asymmetry between valuations is not very high,
ERAP2 > RWP1 and ERAP2 > ERAP1 independently of the level of asymmetry.
All other things being equal, ERAP1 > RWP2 if and only if the level of asymmetry between
valuations is low, RWP2 > ERAP1 > RWP1 if and only if this level is medium, and RWP1 >
ERAP1 if and only if it is high.
Proof. Computations. ￿
The second-price all-pay auction generates a higher rent than the second-price winner-pay
auction if and only if the level of asymmetry is not very high and a higher rent than all the other
auction designs as long as the bidder with the highest adjusted-value takes part in the auction.
Moreover, the revenue performance of the second-price all-pay auctions can be interpreted in
another way when the bidder with the highest adjusted-value participates in the auction. Given
v1 and v2, the second-price all-pay auction outperfoms the second-price winner-pay auction when




On the contrary, when this bidder does not take part in the auction, the ranking of the
expected revenue raised in the second-price all-pay auction depends on the asymmetry between
11bidders’ valuations.
As for second-price all-pay auctions, we can interpret the revenue performance of the ﬁrst-
price all-pay auction relatively to the winner-pay auctions in two independent ways.
• First of all, given the altruism level α, the (ﬁrst-price) all-pay auction is dominated by
the ﬁrst-price winner-pay auction when asymmetry is high. Furthermore, this all-pay
auction raises more money than the second-price winner-pay auction when asymmetry is
low. Thus, in order to determine which design is better to raise money for charity, we need
to know the level of asymmetry between bidders.
• Given v1 and v2, the (ﬁrst-price) all-pay auction is dominated by ﬁrst and second-price
winner-pay auctions when the bidders’ altruism level is less than 1
2(1− v2
v1). Yet, the all-pay
auction outperforms the ﬁrst-price auction and is dominated by the second-price auction




v1 +1) and superior to 1
2(1− v2
v1). In
particular, the threshold above which this all-pay auction raises more money than the ﬁrst-
price winner-pay auction is less than 1
2. Lastly, the ﬁrst-price all-pay auction outperforms





The greater the asymmetry, the higher the level of altruism needs to be for the ﬁrst-price all-
pay auction to give a higher rent than the winner-pay auctions and for the second-price all-pay
auction to give a higher rent than the second-price winner-pay auction. The diﬀerence between
the expected revenue of all-pay auctions and the revenue of winner-pay auctions are depicted in
Figure 1, 2 and 3. These ﬁgures show the limits (in terms of rent domination) for the ﬁrst-price
and second-price all-pay auctions. We use two parameters: altruism level and the asymmetry
among bidders’ values (from left to right,
v2
v1
varies from 0.9 to its limit in zero with a 0.1 step).







Figure 1: ERAP1 > RWP2







Figure 2: ERAP1 > RWP1








Figure 3: ERAP2 > RWP2
As a consequence, in order to determine which design is better to raise money for charity we
need to know both levels of asymmetry and altruism. Contrary to the results of Goeree et al.
(2005), here the all-pay auctions do not always outperform the winner-pay auctions.
6 Conclusion
This paper shows that all-pay auctions do not always raise higher revenue for charity than
winner-pay auctions. This result depends on the asymmetry between bidders. In particular,
winner-pay auctions outperform ﬁrst-price all-pay auction when the asymmetry between bid-
ders is strong. This contradicts Goeree et al. (2005)’s results. Our work can be related to the
one of Carpenter et al. (2008). Indeed, they have found in a ﬁeld experiment that the ﬁrst-price
12winner-pay auction outperforms the ﬁrst-price all-pay auction. This could be due to a strong
asymmetry between bidders.
This work could be completed by a laboratory experiment. To date, only one lab experiment
(Onderstal and Schram (2009)) has been led on charity auctions, with opposite results to the
Carpenter et al. (2008) ﬁeld experiment. Onderstal and Schram (2009) ﬁnd similar results to
Goeree et al. (2005). However, our results are quite diﬀerent from Goeree et al. (2005)’s because
of the introduction of asymmetric valuations and the information setting. That is why it would
be interesting to test our prediction with the introduction of asymmetry between the bidders’
valuation: all-pay auctions can be dominated by winner-pay auctions. Finally, theoretical and
experimental works should be led to the form of the externalities which are mainly considered
in the litterature as linear.
All-pay auctions with externalities that are independent of the winner’s identity but are
functions of the amount raised have other applications in economics.
One application is team theory. This illustration could be connected to other forms of team work
(particularly in ﬁrms) leading to social promotion. Let us consider, a team sport like basketball.
Every year during the American basketball championship (NBA) and the all-stars game ﬁnals,
the most valuable player (MVP) is elected. During such games, every player makes the highest
eﬀort to win the event but also to be elected MVP of the game. Each player beneﬁts from the
team’s eﬀort to win the game and thus can be elected MVP thanks to the externality of the
total eﬀorts made. vi represents the player’s value for the MVP title. Therefore, her eﬀort xi
has two goals: to win the game and be elected MVP. When a player is not elected MVP, she
takes advantage of the externality by winning the game. As a player endeavors to win the game
by making the highest eﬀort, she also helps her team-mates to be elected MVP.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. The sketch of this proof follows the same logic as the proof of Proposition
2 in Anderson et al. (1998). For the same reasons as those pointed out without externalities in
Baye et al. (1996), the two players make their bids on the common support [0,b] and the density
function, F′
i = fi exists. The set of equilibria in mixed strategies is completely characterized by
a Nash equilibria where only pure strategies which are better responses to the other strategies
are played with a strictly positive probability. All these strategies lead to the same expected
utility. From now on, we denote λi = 1
vi. Let us denote F(x) the vector of mixed strategies with
Fi(x) the ith component. Let T be an operator such as T : F(x)  −→ TF(x) with components
TFi(x) ≡ λjx − λj
  b
0
hj(x,y)fi(y)dy + constant (4)
As Fi is a continuous function, we restrict our study to the set of continuous functions on [0,b]
denoted C[0,b]. In particular, we consider Di = {Fi ∈ C[0,b]\||Fi|| ≤ 1} with ||.|| the supremum
norm. The set D ≡ D1 × D2, which includes all the continuous distribution functions, is closed
and convex but not compact (as it is an inﬁnite dimensional set). The set D is endowed with
the norm ||F||2 = maxi=1,2 ||Fi||. Thus, to prove that a vector Fi(x) is solution of (4) for i = 1,2
we apply the following Schauder’s second theorem:
Theorem 1 (Schauder, 1930). If D is a closed convex subset of a normed space and E a
13relatively compact subset of D, then every continuous mapping of D to E has a ﬁxed-point.
To apply this theorem, we need to prove two parts. First, that E ≡ {TF\F ∈ D} is rela-
tively compact.12 Second, T is a continuous mapping from D to E.
In order to establish that E is relatively compact, the characterization of relative compactness
in the space of continuous functions given by the Arzelà-Ascoli’s theorem is used.
Theorem 2 (Arzelà-Ascoli, 1895). A set of functions in C[0,b], with the supremum norm, is
relatively compact if and only if it is uniformly bounded and equicontinuous on [0,b].
Thus, show that E is relatively compact is equivalent to showing that E is uniformly bounded
and equicontinuous on [0,b]. Generalization of the assumption A2 leads to ∂hi
∂x (x,y) < 1 for all
y ∈ [0,b] and i = 1,2. Then, TFi(x) is nondecreasing. Besides, |TFi(x)| ≤ TFi(b) = 1, for
all x ∈ [0,b], Fi ∈ Di and i = 1,2. Consequently, E is uniformly bounded. Let us show that
E is equicontinuous. We need to show that∀ε,∃η such that |TFi(x1) − TFi(x2)| < ε when
|x1 − x2| < η ∀Fi ∈ Di and i = 1,2.
|TFi(x1) − TFi(x2)| =
 
   









|x1 − x2| +
 






   
 
 













The function hj is continuous and bounded on [0,b]. [0,b] is a compact set which explains the re-
sult of the last line. Denoted κj ≡ |supy∈[0,b][hj(x1,y)−hj(x2,y)]|. Thus, |TFi(x1)−TFi(x2)| <
ε for η = ε min
j=1,2
|x1 − x2|
λj(|x1 − x2| + κj)
for all Fi ∈ Di and i = 1,2.
Now, let us prove the continuity of T. Operator T is continuous if, for all F 1,F 2 and for all
ε > 0, there exists a η > 0 such that ||TF 1(x) − TF 2(x)||2 < ε when ||F 1 − F 2||2 < η. Let us
write F1
i (x) = F2
i (x) + gi(x) with −η < gi(x) < η ∀x ∈ [0,b] and i = 1,2. Henceforth
|TF1
i (x) − TF2
i (x)| =
   




i (y) − f2
i (y))dy
   












To go from the ﬁrst to the second line, notice that f1
i (x) − f2
i (x) = g′
i(x). We use the fact that
hj is a continuous function on [0,b] bounded by a maximum hj(b,b) to go to the third line.




for all x ∈ [0,b]. ￿
12A space is relatively compact when its closed span is compact.
14Proof of Proposition 3.
Lemma 1. Let us consider i and j the two potential participants. Then, bidder i’s mixed







∀x ∈ [0,+∞) and the expected revenue by
ER =
2vivj
(1 − 2αi)vj + (1 − 2αj)vi
.




(vi − (1 − 2αi)x)dFj(x) − (1 − 2αi)xi(1 − Fj(xi))




of the values vi we get a positive transformation of the expected utility without any externalities.
The mixed strategies at the equilibrium would be not alterated by this transformation.
Lemma 2. Let n be the number of potential participants. Then, only two bidders among n
participate actively to the auction.


























      
B
A represents bidder i’s expected payment when we take into account her own external eﬀect.
The term B is the expected payment of bidder i’s rivals. αiB is the sum of the externalities of
bidder i’s rivals from which i beneﬁts.






















      
AII
.
The term AI is i’s expected payment when she wins i.e. he pays the second highest bid. AII is






























































. The independence of



















= xi(1 − Gi(xi))
The independence of the distribution functions, explains how we go from the ﬁrst line to the
second.
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We add all the expected external eﬀects. The case where player l  = i takes the second highest























































































































































































































As the expected utility is constant at the equilibrium, the FOC leads to
viG′











Notice that (n − 1)Gi(x) =
 
l =i






(vi − αix(n − 2))G′
i(x) + (1 − αin)Gi(x) = (1 − αi) − αi
 
l =i
Gil(x) ∀i ∈ {1,...,n}. (A1)
This result is true for all n > 3. The closed characterization of the solution is very diﬃcult.
Yet, we can deduce the solution by an alternative way. Indeed, let Fi and Fj be the mixed
strategies of the two bidders i and j. We can notice that the derivative of the expected utility of
a third bidder k Hk(x) = ∂EUk
∂x (xi,X1,X2) is a monotonous increasing function. Furthermore,
Hk(0) = −(1 − αk) and limx→+∞ Hk(x) = 0. Thus, given the mixed strategies of i and j, k
do not participate. This result can easily be extended to a number n of bidders. For that, we
should use recurrence.
From Lemma 1 and 2 the result follows. ￿
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